not end in two terms. But one and
the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore
delight and joy are altogether the same.

Obj. 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is
equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and
cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions
of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not
differ from delight.

_On the contrary,_ We do not speak of joy in irrational animals;
whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same
as delight.

_I answer that,_ Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of
delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated
above (Q. 30, A. 3), so also some delights are natural, and some are
not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some
delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the
same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire
naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a
result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight
follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals,
but only delight.

Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be
the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational
beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since
sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing
thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more
things than does joy.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an
apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to
diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also
called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences (Q. 30, A. 3, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences
also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy
corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence
of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to
the difference of movement.

Reply Obj. 3: Th