ord with reason; and an
evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant
from reason and the law of God.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of
which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to
actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede
them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions
are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of
good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it is not the pleasures
which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy
prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the
body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Q. 33,
A. 3), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something
repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by
fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the
pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason,
on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the
pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason
is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for
reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.
We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason
through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice,
since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a
kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent;
because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 98, A. 2) the case was
different in the state of innocence.
Reply Obj. 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but
those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that
children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all
pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural
appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply Obj. 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with
the making of external things, as we shall state further on (Q. 57,
A. 3). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the
concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an
art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of
making arguments," as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-I
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