r is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that
weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for
another's wrongs." But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's
wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed
down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this
division is incorrect.
_On the contrary,_ stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
_I answer that,_ It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in
two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and
virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal."
Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2, 3). But, secondly, a thing may be
added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed
by that genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to
"animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the genus,
according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species.
But sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus,
through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which
the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame
is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature
of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of
astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch
as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow
are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something
foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the
cause or the object, or of the effect. For the proper object of
sorrow is _one's own evil._ Hence sorrow may be concerned for an
object foreign to it either through one's being sorry for an evil
that is not one's own; and thus we have _pity_ which is sorrow for
another's evil, considered, however, as one's own: or through one's
being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but
another's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we
have _envy._ The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain
_flight of the appetite._ Wherefore the foreign element in the effect
of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by
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