: not because you were
made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance."
Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in
itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's
being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being
thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of
temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may
be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the house
of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in
mind of the end of all."

Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful,
since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil
is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for
its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the
good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good
more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.

Reply Obj. 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive
sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul,
and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by
reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to
be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is
useful.

Reply Obj. 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but
sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 4]

Whether Bodily Pain Is the Greatest Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because
"the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain
pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore
a certain pain is the greatest evil.

Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his
last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he
will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4, Obj.
5; Q. 5, A. 8, Obj. 3). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the
fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening
contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6, 15).
Therefore pain is man's greatest evil.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are
composed of two parts, i.e.