d both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty,
as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a special
passion, since it belongs to different powers.
_On the contrary,_ Fear is condivided with the other passions of the
soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12, 15).
_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul derive their species from
their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special
object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the
object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so
the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.
Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one source,
viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of
this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the
soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.
Reply Obj. 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but
avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance
be something common, yet fear is a special passion.
Reply Obj. 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards
evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost
unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions
of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above
(Q. 25, A. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is
ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object
of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future
evil which is either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is
ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the
desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while
avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from
what has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 29, A. 2; Q. 36, A. 2).
________________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 3]
Whether There Is a Natural Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear,
through the soul refusing to be severed from the body."
Obj. 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1).
But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
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