hich provokes anger
is always something considered in the light of an injustice.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not
angry,--if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering
justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just."
Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through
ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a
man does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on
purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 8.
Wherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion,
have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an
injury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry
with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through
ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury,
and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on
the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from
contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all,
or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because
they do not seem to have acted slightingly."
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's
excellence: because "men think little of things that are not worth
much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from
all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so
far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Reply Obj. 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man
suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or
slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of
itself the cause of anger.
Reply Obj. 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as
such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with
anything derogatory thereto.
Reply Obj. 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of
slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the
more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if
a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this
seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show
signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little
about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying
out h
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