and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius
disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply
diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the
diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be
no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say
otherwise that, as was explained above (Q. 49, A. 2, ad 1), the
adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to
their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and
so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities,
which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change
as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to
like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, art. 2]

Whether the Soul Is the Subject of Habit in Respect of Its Essence or
in Respect of Its Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of
its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of
dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Q.
49, A. 2). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the
powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the
nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in
the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers.

Obj. 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit
is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of
accident, as we have said in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 1, ad 5).
Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.

Obj. 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the
subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it
is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore
habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits
in the various powers of the soul.

_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 49, AA. 2, 3), habit
implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation.
If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot
be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul
itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in
this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by
reason of