nnot differentiate any being. Therefore
habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.

Obj. 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits;
for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not
divided into good and bad.

_On the contrary,_ A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue
to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad
habits.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), habits are specifically
distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,
but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.
First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature.
In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit:
since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the
agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act
unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human
nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are
discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it
is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference
of good and bad.

Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the
fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower
nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher
nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting
human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which
disposes to an act befitting some higher nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far as
contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen
that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits
follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into
good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad;
but not by reason of one habit being [about] something good, and
another about something bad.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the good which is common to every being, that
is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some
determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz.
the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a