of all the virtues.
Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral
virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue
is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done
from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the
rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (Q. 64,
AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a
habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every
human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with
reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his
reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue
is a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher [says] (Ethic. i, 13): "When we
speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or
intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then,
wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are
virtues, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Therefore not every virtue
is a moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ In order to answer this question clearly, we must
consider the meaning of the Latin word _mos;_ for thus we shall be
able to discover what a _moral_ virtue is. Now _mos_ has a twofold
meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts
15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (_morem_) of
Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or
quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which
sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2)
that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more,
i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the
word is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who
maketh men of one manner (_moris_) to dwell in a house." For both
these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek
there is a distinct word for each, for the word _ethos_is written
sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short _e._

Now _moral_ virtue is so called from _mos_ in the sense of a natural
or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the
other meaning of _mos,_ i.e. _custom,_ is akin to this: because
custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar
to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an a