j. 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be
caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the
theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive,
from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our
supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But
the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard
to other things, yet in relation to God.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does
not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in
addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his
supernatural end.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]

Whether Virtue by Habituation Belongs to the Same Species As Infused
Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in
species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues,
according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save
in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified,
not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused
moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of
infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires
of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.

Obj. 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is
wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature.
But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten
naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one
produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired
and infused virtue belong to the same species.

_On the contrary,_ Any change introduced into the difference
expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the
definition of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in
us without us," as stated above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore acquired
virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species
as infused virtue.

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold specific difference among habits.
The first, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1),
is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now
the object of every virtue is