ut if
this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition,
or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done
when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by
deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity
or poverty.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]

Whether the Mean of Moral Virtue Is the Real Mean, or the Rational
Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the
rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue
consists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in _Metaph._
ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral
virtue is a real mean.

Obj. 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral
virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a
mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral
virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

Obj. 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or
geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of
justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral
virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral
virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason."

_I answer that,_ The rational mean can be understood in two ways.
First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason,
as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in
this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but
the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the
rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that
which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense
every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated
(A. 1), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity
with right reason.

But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real
mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for
instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean
is not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such
is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is
that justice is about operations, which deal with external things,
wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as
stated a