down. For it has been stated (A. 3)
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues
as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul
are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost.
Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5:
"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,
Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence.
Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence,
so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so
that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of
which can one possess without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as
gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to
instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this
sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and
knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the
"word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts
of the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but
perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the
promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and
human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are
possessed of charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (Obj. 1): hence he
is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a
gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For
it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain
the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another,
to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against
the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the
proper name of knowledge."

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues
is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected
by another, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another." We a