have the
character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior
act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to
this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even
considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of
term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4;
_Ethic._ x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so
far as term has the character of end.
Reply Obj. 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct
species of sins, but to show their various causes.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]
Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against God, Against
Oneself, and Against One's Neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin
against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the
division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for
it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law,"
as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6). Therefore sin against God should not
be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, every division should consist of things in
opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not
opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins
against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly
divided into these three.
Obj. 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But
God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not
distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin
is unfittingly divided according to these three.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of
sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
against his neighbor."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an
inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in
relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and
passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another
order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man
should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a
solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is
naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in _Polit._ i, 2,
hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is
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