ds on their causes?

(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?

(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?

(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?

(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the
person sinning?
________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 1]

Whether All Sins Are Connected with One Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is
written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend
in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of
transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all
sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.

Obj. 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever
lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (Q. 65, A. 1).
Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues.
Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.

Obj. 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a
principle in common, as stated above (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). Now as the
virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love
of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of
all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is
the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has
one, has them all.

_On the contrary,_ Some vices are contrary to one another, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together
in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and
vices to be connected with one another.

_I answer that,_ The intention of the man who acts according to
virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of
the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of
every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason,
wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same
end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right
reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (Q. 65,
A. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point
of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to
some appetible go