act, another power
becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both
because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the
contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be
directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a
certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one
thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of
distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced
in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the
rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or
altogether impeded.

Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate
apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power,
as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that
the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the
estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even
as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue:
for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of
passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of
their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often
follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the
will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination
always to follow the judgment of the reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not
the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower;
but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.

The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]

Whether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Passion, Against Its
Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by
the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the
strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion,
which is weak and soon passes away.

Obj. 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. No