nses.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 80, Art. 3]

Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin of Necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of
necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said
of the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can
compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he
dwells on the earth.

Obj. 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of
things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented
to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the
senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii,
text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated
above (A. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq.
lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the
cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses,
it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds,
seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin
of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is
some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the devil
can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the
way explained above (A. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of
necessity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): "Your adversary the
devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour."
Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man
were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he
cannot induce man to sin of necessity.

Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God,
but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said
neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in
any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to
resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not
compel to sin.

_I answer that,_ The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained
by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin;
but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident
from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin,
except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede
altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive