unishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle
speaks (Rom. 1:24) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the
desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit,
when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome
by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the
punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance
of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior
act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act,
as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in
order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied
ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the
effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its
effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in
respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself.
Reply Obj. 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall
into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it
is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise
from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the
amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are
the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is
evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment,
since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of
a nature to withdraw man from sin.
Reply Obj. 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and
the same answer applies to the Third Objection.
________________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 3]
Whether Any Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since
justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Isa. 27:8): "In measure
against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now
sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal
punishment.
Obj. 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3).
But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end,
and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher
states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it
for its own sake. But "God hat
|