y mortal because venial,
by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason,
which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above
in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is
contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves
contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that
they are mortal by reason of their genus.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial
from their cause.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]

Whether Venial Sin Is a Disposition to Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to
mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated
above (A. 1). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,
wherefore it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2, that "from like acts
like dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial
sin differ in genus or species, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore
venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to
mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a
venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore
Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for
good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would
be venial sins, which is absurd.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth
small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins
venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and
little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there
is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of
disposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the
production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause
which moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces
a pillar is