ing may be called a habit in two ways. First,
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit.
For it has been stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2) that the natural law
is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of
reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he
does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar.
Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit
properly and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And
accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes
considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason
only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit.
Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not
the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the
principles the habit of which we possess.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of
virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action,
he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts,
viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the
soul besides these three: there are acts; thus _to will_ is in the
one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its
own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the
like.
Reply Obj. 2: _Synderesis_ is said to be the law of our mind, because
it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are
the first principles of human actions.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that
sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him
habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep,
a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through
the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of
understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him
habitually.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2]
Whether the Natural Law Contains Several Precepts, or Only One?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above
(Q. 92, A. 2). If therefore there were
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