2) Its origin.
(3) Its quality.
(4) Its division.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 1]
Whether It Was Useful for Laws to Be Framed by Men?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be
framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made
good thereby, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.
Obj. 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted
to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Obj. 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1,
2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite
in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot
be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that
in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread
of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these
things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that
human laws should be made.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 94, A. 3), man has
a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be
acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe
that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in
food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature,
viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as
other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing
and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for
himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined,
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