e it was necessary,
whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for
very few matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply Obj. 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the
law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher
says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that
has happened or not happened," and the like.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]
Whether Every Human Law Is Derived from the Natural Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from
the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the
legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference."
But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
from the natural law.
Obj. 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as
stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But
those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of
the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q. 94, A.
4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong
to the natural law.
Obj. 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which
is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived
from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for
all: which is clearly false.
Obj. 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are
derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the
reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist
says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.].
Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and
reverence for the laws."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is
not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law
depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is
said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason.
But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from
what has been stated above (Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2). Consequently every
huma
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