e; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express
in words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in
view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into
consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid
confusion: but should frame the law according to that which is of
most common occurrence.
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QUESTION 97

OF CHANGE IN LAWS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether human law is changeable?

(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better
occurs?

(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the
force of law?

(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by
dispensation of those in authority?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether Human Law Should Be Changed in Any Way?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in
any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably.
Therefore human law should also remain without any change.

Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure
should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human
acts, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it should remain
without change.

Obj. 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as
stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But that which is right once is right
always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal
law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), human law is a
dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be
two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of
reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law.
The cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human
reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence,
in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early
philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by
those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who
first endeavored to discover something useful for the human
community, not being able by themselves to take