his neighbor and the truth): and
are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently with
regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to
proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed.
Reply Obj. 6: As stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), all the passions of the
irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part.
Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first
elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible
passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]
Whether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us
than God is; according to 1 John 4:20: "He that loveth not his
brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But
the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other
seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of
the decalogue are not set in proper order.
Obj. 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative
precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts.
But according to Boethius in his commentary on the _Categories_
[*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues
are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the
negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.
Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But
actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore
the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are
unsuitably placed last in order.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "The things that are
of God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of
God']. But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by
God, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming
order.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 3, 5, ad 1), the precepts of
the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.
Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by
the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.
Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end,
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