8). Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be
punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of
virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is
contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at leading man to
virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of
virtue does not fall under the precept.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 3, ad 2), a precept of
law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the
law is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law.
Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in _Ethic._
x, 9, because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for
which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human
law are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties;
since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which
come under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in
accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law,
is competent to judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those
things that appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the
framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward
movements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts
and reins is God."
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in
some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect
it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in
another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine
law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the
Philosopher states in _Ethic._ ii. The first is that man should act
"knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and
human law; because what a man does in ignorance, he does
accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain
things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or
pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,
about which we have spoken above (QQ. 8, 12): and concerning these
two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For
human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not:
whereas the Divine law does, according to Matt.
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