spensation is given by men
in this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of
human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain.
Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

Obj. 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a
precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in
that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the
Sabbath-day, we will fight against him." Therefore the precepts of
the decalogue are dispensable.

_On the contrary,_ are the words of Isa. 24:5, where some are
reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken
the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the
precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue
cannot be changed by dispensation.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), precepts
admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which,
if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver
is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first
and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and
virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If
therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation
of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such
precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are
indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted,
such as this--that no man should work for the destruction of the
commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man
should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of
dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the
above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these
latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the
omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial
to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver.
For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were
enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch
as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on
account of some greater utility.

Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, whic