lt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases.
Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that
"justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as
fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human
affairs; to the ceremonial precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore
the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that
those things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and
those things "commandments" which He enjoined (_mandavit_) through
others, as the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either
moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not
the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the
precepts, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion
of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far
as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as
Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be
anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 6]
Whether the Old Law Should Have Induced Men to the Observance of Its
Precepts, by Means of Temporal Promises and Threats?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced
men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises
and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to
God by fear and love: hence it is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now,
Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou
fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?" But the
desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity."
Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the
intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as
the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.
Now, in science
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