ity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 1]
Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Belong to the Law of
Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to
the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He
gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But
instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the
law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct.
Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But
human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that
belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the
natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions
are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there
why the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances
pertaining to good morals.
Obj. 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in
certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that
faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of
nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not
all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles,
who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law":
which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals.
Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of
nature.
_I answer that,_ The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature
to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to
reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are
called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which
are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative
reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so
every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known
naturally, as stated above (Q. 94, AA. 2, 4): from which principles
one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some
matters connected with human actions are so evide
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