hese imperfect
ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet
greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that violently
bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; and (Matt. 9:17) that if "new
wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles,"
i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine runneth
out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt,
break into evils worse still.

Reply Obj. 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal
law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government
of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished
by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do
everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it
does." Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is
forbidden by the natural law.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 3]

Whether Human Law Prescribes Acts of All the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of
all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But
human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (A. 2).
Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is
the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under
a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above
(Q. 90, A. 2). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the
common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not
prescribe all acts of virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law
"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the
acts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in
like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the
former, forbidding the latter."

_I answer that,_ The species of virtues are distinguished by their
objects, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 62, A. 2).
Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private
good of an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus
matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the
state, or for upholding the rights