orce of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by
his own will, according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum
omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep
himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus]
says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover the Lord
reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens
and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger of their own they
will not move them" (Matt. 23:3, 4). Hence, in the judgment of God,
the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force;
but he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint.
Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is
expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it according to
time and place.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 6]

Whether He Who Is Under a Law May Act Beside the Letter of the Law?

Objection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act
beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31):
"Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when
once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, but according
to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that
he observes the intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment
on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to
disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of
the lawgiver.

Obj. 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can
make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the
law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the
lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter of the law.

Obj. 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by
words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for
Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree
just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the
lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is
said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not
subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take
account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), every law is directed to the
common