conditions; viz. that
it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine
law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it is
proportionate to the nature law; and that it "further the common
weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.

All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he
goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according
to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies
that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends
first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just":
secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline
should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also
into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should not
be laid on children as adults); and should be according to human
customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to
others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of
which he says, "adapted to place and time." The remaining words,
"necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common
weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal of evils;
"usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to
the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And
since, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2), law is ordained to the common
good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 4]

Whether Isidore's Division of Human Laws Is Appropriate?

Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human
statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he
includes the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says,
"nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that
which is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not
contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law.

Obj. 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ
not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the
commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions
(Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ,
except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction:
sinc