?

(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?

(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?

(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?

(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter
of the law?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 1]

Whether Human Law Should Be Framed for the Community Rather Than for
the Individual?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for
the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular
acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject
of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are
framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for
the community, but also for the individual.

Obj. 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above
(Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But human acts are about individual matters.
Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but
rather for the individual.

Obj. 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated
above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But a measure should be most certain, as
stated in _Metaph._ x. Since therefore in human acts no general
proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual
cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for
individual cases.

_On the contrary,_ The Jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit.
iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the
majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may
possibly happen in an individual case."

_I answer that,_ Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to
that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private
benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence human
laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good
comprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many
things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the
community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is
procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a
short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one
another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides th