n law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived
from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law
of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural
law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by
way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like
to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn
from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that
whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details:
thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to
some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the
general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g.
that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the
principle that "one should do harm to no man": while some are derived
therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that
the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or
that way, is a determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in
human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force
from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the
second way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which
are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the
natural law.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived
from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply Obj. 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be
applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of
human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.
Reply Obj. 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as
referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of
the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they
see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and
opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudenc
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