regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in
all men.
Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law
belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his
nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;
some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for
all.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is
common to all nations."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law
belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.
Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated
in _Phys._ i. The speculative reason, however, is differently
situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the
speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things, which
cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the
universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical
reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about
which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there
is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to
matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.
Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men,
both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is
not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the
principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action,
truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters
of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is
the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to
all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles
whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is
the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper
conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all,
but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the
three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles,
although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of
the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for
all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by a
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