n Is Competent to Make Laws?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to
make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles,
who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law .
. . they are a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in
general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.

Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the
intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man
can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is
competent to make laws.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state,
so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign
of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a
family can make laws for his household.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance
of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together
with the Commonalty."

_I answer that,_ A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost
the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common
good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the
viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law
belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has
care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of
anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), a law is in a person not
only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that
is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far
as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him.
Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in
their hearts."

Reply Obj. 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue
efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not
taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in
order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in
the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to
inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q. 92, A. 2, ad 3;
II-II, Q. 64, A. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him
alone.

Reply Obj. 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household
is a part of the state: and the state is a perfe