speak otherwise of the law of man, than of
the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends
only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is
because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the
government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a
law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of
irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself
moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move
themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2).
Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however
much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational
beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement
of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle
of action.

Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God
imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions.
And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature,
according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass
away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are
subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence;
but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine
commandment.

Reply Obj. 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to
natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law,
by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human
actions, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are
obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine
Reason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over
more things than human reason does. And as the members of the human
body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of
reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too
irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account,
being rational.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are
outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the
order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God,
from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the First