ngs
in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of
his art, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 8). Moreover He
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each
single creature, as was also stated in the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5).
Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all
things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so
the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end,
bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing
else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and
movements.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal
types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and
consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality,
according to their different relations to things, as stated in the
First Part (Q. 15, A. 2). But law is said to direct human acts by
ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). And
things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one,
according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the
eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.

Reply Obj. 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be
considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the
word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man,
and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same
applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else than
something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts
mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the
Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the
Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the
Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as
Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things
expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby.
Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God:
yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between
type and word.

Reply Obj. 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the
same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the
human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not
true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with
things, since "an opinion is true or fals