d since also the practical reason makes use of a
syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (Q. 13,
A. 3; Q. 76, A. 1) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii,
3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the
same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative
intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like
universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed
to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are
sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are
retained in the reason by means of a habit.

Reply Obj. 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated
above (Q. 17, A. 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the
end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained
to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may
have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of
reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the
will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's
will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 2]

Whether the Law Is Always Something Directed to the Common Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the
common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to
forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.
Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.

Obj. 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human
actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is
directed to some particular good.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on
reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the
foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also
of that which is directed to private good. Therefore the law is not
only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an
individual.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted
for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the law belongs to that
which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and
measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason
itself there is something which is the principle in