cted for a sin."

_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 6), punishment can be
considered in two ways--simply, and as being satisfactory. A
satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who
differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union
of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the
punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take
the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of
punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has
always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a
relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a
sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and
this, either principally or consequently--principally, the punishment
of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived
of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result
from this defect in human nature.

Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and
yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Now evil is privation of
good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good
of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man
suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater
good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health,
or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the
glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply
but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of
punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man
prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them
to health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking,
they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted
sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of
penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself
the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state
of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in
virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is
reduced to original sin as its cause.

Reply Obj. 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or
which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of
original sin, as st