shment itself is the effect of sin,
not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of
punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is."
Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the
effect of sin.
Reply Obj. 3: This punishment of the _inordinate affection_ is due to
sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a
further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or
human law.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 2]
Whether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of
virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not
bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite
direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.
Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against
the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q. 74,
AA. 1, 2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins
are punishments of others.
_I answer that,_ We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its
essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto.
Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin
considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for
it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas
punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Consequently it is evident that sin
regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.
On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in
three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing
an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and
the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine
grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the
withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above
(Q. 79, A. 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is
also a p
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