punishment of infinite quantity.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 5]

Whether Every Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment. Because punishment, as stated above (A. 4), is
proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely
from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs
infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot
be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting
punishment, as stated above (A. 4), it seems that no sin incurs a
debt of mere temporal punishment.

Obj. 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore
Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is
incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But
original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have
died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the
kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words (John 3:3): "Unless a
man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more,
therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.

Obj. 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through
being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its
punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment
if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there
is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves
eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any
sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter
sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not
punished eternally.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a sin incurs a debt of
eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in
the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very
principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in
some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve
contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things
referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little
intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for
instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would
not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments.
Consequently such sins do not incur ev