s are
insufficiently enumerated.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates
them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those
which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this
kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the
condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong
inclination for one particular end, the result being that he
frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does
not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular
dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a
natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this
way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this
kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends
have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is
in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are
differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First,
directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek
it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.
Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were:
thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a
good on account of some attendant evil.

Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a
certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,
merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and
praise, and this good is sought inordinately by _vainglory._
Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the
preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is
pursued inordinately by _gluttony,_ or the preservation of the
species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately
by _lust._ Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which
_covetousness_ is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately
the contrary evils.

Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some
property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect
good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by
_pride_ or _vainglory._ Secondly, it implies satiety, which