thority of Bede suffices [*Reference not
known].

_I answer that,_ As a result of original justice, the reason had
perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself
was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original
justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already
stated (Q. 81, A. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as
it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally
directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.

Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of
virtue, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2), viz. the reason, where
prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the
subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of
temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its
order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the
will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice;
in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous,
there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is
deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there
is the wound of concupiscence.

Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human
nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the
inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on
account of actual sin, as was explained above (AA. 1, 2), these four
wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin,
the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will
hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and
concupiscence more impetuous.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not
be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is
more easily inclined to sin again.

Reply Obj. 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a
certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen.
8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The
imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his
youth.'].

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 82, A. 3, ad 1), concupiscence is
natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so
far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.

Reply Obj. 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called
a w