eakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the
reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary
to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.

Reply Obj. 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of
Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers,
viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to
these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good.
"Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed
through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 4]

Whether Privation of Mode, Species and Order Is the Effect of Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order
is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii)
that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are
less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at
all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does
not destroy mode, species and order.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the
"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De
Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is
not the effect of sin.

Obj. 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now
since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding
privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the
result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and
order is not the effect of each sin.

_On the contrary,_ Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body,
according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now
weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part, Q. 5, A. 5, mode,
species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such,
and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such
depends on its form from which it derives its species. Again, any
kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything
whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in
_Metaph._ viii, that "the forms of things are like numbers," so that
a form has a certain _mode_ corresponding to its measure. Lastly
owing to its form, each thing has a relation of _order_ to something
else.

Accordingly there are different grades of