FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   752   753   754   755   756   757   758   759   760   761   762   763   764   765   766   767   768   769   770   771   772   773   774   775   776  
777   778   779   780   781   782   783   784   785   786   787   788   789   790   791   792   793   794   795   796   797   798   799   800   801   >>   >|  
virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul. _I answer that,_ One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. The reason for this is that, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the flesh. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." Consequently it follows that the flesh is
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   752   753   754   755   756   757   758   759   760   761   762   763   764   765   766   767   768   769   770   771   772   773   774   775   776  
777   778   779   780   781   782   783   784   785   786   787   788   789   790   791   792   793   794   795   796   797   798   799   800   801   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

subject

 

original

 
accrues
 

character

 

Apostle

 

transmitted

 

punishment

 
stated
 

reason

 

virtue


Accordingly

 

consenting

 

instrumental

 

principal

 
instrument
 

gluttony

 

action

 

concupiscence

 

faculty

 

concupiscible


partaking

 

evoked

 
instruments
 
speaking
 
passage
 

lxxxiii

 
redeemed
 

Consequently

 
liable
 
delivered

aptitude
 

natural

 
internal
 
members
 

Augustine

 

Retract

 
corruption
 
nutritive
 

sinned

 
dwelleth

answer

 

Therefore

 

bodily

 

actual

 

generation

 

movement

 
observed
 

motion

 
transmission
 

posterity