ed above.

Reply Obj. 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a
habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there
is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because
evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be
perfect without the evil of fault.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]

Whether It Is More Grievous to Sin Through Certain Malice Than
Through Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin
through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance
excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is
greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins
through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers
from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false
estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action.
Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain
malice, than for one who sins through passion.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous
his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into
sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain
malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than
that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than
to sin through passion.

Obj. 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through
choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.
Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain
malice.

_On the contrary,_ A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very
reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath
struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on
purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased
except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through
being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.

_I answer that,_ A sin committed through malice is more grievous than
a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because,
as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other
things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the
movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is
committed through malice, the movement of sin belon