ned which incline to good, as being the causes of
those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 6]

Whether Sin Is Alleviated on Account of a Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of
passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot
thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now
passion is a cause of sin, as stated (A. 5). Therefore the more
intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not
diminish sin, but increases it.

Obj. 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit,
as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit:
for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a
greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also
increases rather than diminishes a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as
he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the
will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act.
Therefore passion aggravates a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The passion of concupiscence is called a
temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that
overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De
Civ. Dei iv, 12).

_I answer that,_ Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,
which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a
movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be
related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently:
antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws
or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA. 1, 2; Q. 10, A.
3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers
redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be
moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the
sensitive appetite.

Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must
needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is
voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our
control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the
reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the
impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control.
In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes
its voluntarine