icked things": and
this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do
those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But
those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin:
because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of
remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not
committed through certain malice.

_On the contrary,_ A sin committed through certain malice is one that
is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
which we are inclined by habit, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2 with
regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is
committed through certain malice.

_I answer that,_ There is a difference between a sin committed by one
who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not
necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the
person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something
we use when we will," as stated above (Q. 50, A. 1). And thus, even
as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth
into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason
altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being
that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it
may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from
that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through
ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin
through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever
is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of
something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to
him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very
thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something
that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a
spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in
respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice.
Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through
certain malice.

Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting
in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply,
but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not
a simple but a relative evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the
acts from