venial in three ways. First, through its
cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens
the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance
is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin,
through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon (_veniam_).
Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of
venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection
regards the first kind.

Reply Obj. 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to
something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which
follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A. 6, ad
1): hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason
altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its
free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however,
the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer
either mortal or venial.
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QUESTION 78

OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.
malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice,
i.e. purposely?

(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain
malice?

(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through
habit?

(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than
through passion?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 1]

Whether Anyone Sins Through Certain Malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through
certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain
malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They
err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works
intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of _malitia_
(malice) from _malum_ (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not
denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental.
Therefore no one sins through malice.

Obj. 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a
cause of sin, it follows that sin