e sensitive appetite can move or incline
the will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16: "Concupiscence of the
eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life."
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
________________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]
Whether the Will Is Moved by a Passion of the Sensitive Appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of
the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its
object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as
it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive
power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object
of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good
defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive
appetite does not move the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the
soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to
a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the
rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the
heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot
be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is
material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not
use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De
Anima_ iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material
force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a
passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective
appetite.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted
thy heart."
_I answer that,_ A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or
move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two
ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's
powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of
necessity that, when one power is intent in its
|