t from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore
morose delectation is not in the reason.
Obj. 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs,
since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.
Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not
about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose
delectation is not in the reason.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin
_mora_--delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is
no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore
morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the
consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere
thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman
alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes
the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12).
Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.
_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 5), sin may be in the reason, not only
in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its
directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not
only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the
reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in
the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now
it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it
commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately
provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when
it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance,
when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of
passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell
(_immoratur_) upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense
the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its
proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
accordance with what has been stated above (A. 1), viz. that actions
which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their
principles.
Reply Obj. 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper
object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those
lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly
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